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International commercial surrogacy
Beyond feminist conundrums  
and the child as product
Kristen E. Cheney
International commercial surrogacy (ICS) is a growing phenomenon 
in which the dynamics of global economic inequality between women 
are often reproduced in the effort to produce children. ICS, in which a 
commissioning parent(s) goes abroad to hire a surrogate mother to carry 
a child for them, confounds a number of ‘feminist’ interpretations and 
evaluations of the practice: while some believe it provides poor women 
with an opportunity to use their bodies to increase their wealth while 
providing a service, others see it as outsourcing reproduction through 
economic exploitation of surrogate mothers.
ICS thus raises interesting questions not only about the commodi-
fication of bodies  – women’s and children’s  – but the naturalisation of 
the woman– child dyad premised on the notion of motherhood. With 
new assisted reproductive technologies (ART) such as trans- border 
gestational surrogacy, successful physical reproduction in the form of 
giving birth to a child is actually a severing link between the surrogate 
mother who gives birth and the child, who is not genetically linked to 
the surrogate mother. Surrogacy thus challenges the ‘natural’ equation of 
woman/ child with mother/ child, shifting those relations through finan-
cial transaction.
Moreover, ‘the best interests of the child’ are often invoked in ICS 
arrangements to defend political positions that tend to reify the ‘natural’ 
genetic family  – construed as heteronormative and patriarchal. The 
best- interest principle of children’s rights also highlights the lack of con-
sideration for the actual politics of childhood in surrogacy: for example, 
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how children get frozen in time as babies – who are ultimately regarded 
as ‘products’ of ICS – and thus their actual interests are glossed over. This 
seldom- considered aspect of ICS may thus help inform feminist debates 
about the practice. This chapter will therefore attempt to move beyond 
the feminist conundrum of reproductive labour in ICS to consider the 
child as more than just a product and/ or objective of the practice to 
thinking about them as persons with their own interests in it – not just 
in not/ being born but in knowing the circumstances around their births 
and the women who birthed them. Can bringing feminist and childhood 
scholarship into conversation help to achieve social and economic jus-
tice for both women and children involved in surrogacy?
To address this question, after a brief overview of the terms used in 
surrogacy, I provide an overview of feminist and child- centred analyses 
of ICS. I  then discuss how the phenomenon of ICS speaks to the main 
questions raised by the editors of this volume, considering how ICS is 
‘good to think with’ in order to disrupt some of the fundamental assump-
tions about woman– child relationships. This allows me to turn to how 
a dialogue with childhood studies might help escape some of the quag-
mires created by feminist analyses of the practice.
A brief history of surrogacy: terminology matters
It is important to note that the words used to describe surrogacy and its 
various participants have been highly contested, as they tend to reflect 
the values and ideologies that various speakers  – scholars, activists, 
and policymakers – assign to them.1 DasGupta and Das Dasgupta point 
out that the intermediaries of the surrogacy trade have controlled the 
discourse around it in a way that ‘purposefully ignores differentials in 
global economic and political power and assumes a level playing field’.2 
Bailey further warns that ‘extending Western moral frameworks to . . . 
surrogacy work raises the specter of discursive colonialism along with 
concerns about how Western intellectual traditions distort, erase, and 
misread non- Western subjects’ lived experiences’.3 As in any other field, 
the words used to describe surrogacy are necessarily political. Moreover, 
battles over terminology demonstrate how ICS confounds the presumed 
naturalness of the mother– child dyad.
‘Traditional’ surrogacy emerged in the 1980s to refer to a scenario 
in which a woman uses her eggs and womb to bear a child for another 
woman. However, it was something of a misnomer: ‘ . . .before the devel-
opment of third- party reproduction, a woman who gave birth but did not 
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play other maternal roles, as in adoption, was referred to as the “birth 
mother” or “biological mother”, sometimes even with the single but 
contested word “birthmother”. These terms were applied to distinguish 
her from the “adoptive mother” ’,4 who is technically a surrogate to the 
child in place of the birth mother. With advancements in ART, however, 
it became possible for women to become ‘gestational’ surrogates: in ges-
tational surrogacy, a fertilised egg is implanted in a surrogate womb and 
brought to term there. Given the infamous child custody cases that arose 
from traditional surrogacy in the 1980s and 90s, gestational surrogacy – 
in which the surrogate mother has no genetic connection to the child, 
thus precluding any legal challenges over parentage  – became a much 
more desired option and so makes up the bulk of surrogacy arrangements 
today, including virtually all ICS arrangements. Popular destinations for 
ICS have included the USA, India and Thailand, but with recent restric-
tions placed on ICS in India and a ban in Thailand the market is shifting 
to destinations such as Nepal, Mexico and the Ukraine.5
The terminology also obligingly expanded alongside ART to frame 
the various relationships between mother(s) and child(ren) in surrogacy. 
These terms either serve to distance or to associate women who act as 
surrogates and the children to whom they give birth. During the 2014 
International Forum on Intercountry Adoption and Global Surrogacy 
in The Hague, participants noted that those who employ terms that 
acknowledge the maternity of the surrogate actually incorporated the 
term ‘mother’, while terms such as ‘gestational carrier’ focused more on 
the task performed by the woman giving birth to children within a sur-
rogacy arrangement, obscuring not only her maternity but also in some 
cases her humanity.6 Some examples of the former include ‘gestational 
mother’, ‘carrying mother’, and of course ‘surrogate mother’, while exam-
ples of the latter may employ the same modifiers but in these instances 
as nouns without the word ‘mother’: ‘gestational host’, ‘carrier’, or simply 
‘surrogate’. Some terms such as ‘contract pregnancy’ have also come into 
usage specifically to further obviate any potential legal claims to mother-
hood by commercial surrogates.7
However, terms used to describe those who wish to become parents 
in surrogacy arrangements tend to circle around narrow definitions of 
genetically based biological connection, almost always including the term 
‘parents’. This is because national and international laws generally privi-
lege genetics in their definitions of relatedness. There is also emphasis 
on parental aspiration, e.g. ‘intended parents’. ‘Commissioning parents’ 
or ‘contracting parents’ have also been commonly used, but many pro-
ponents of surrogacy dislike the way these terms index the commercial 
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aspects of the practice. Interestingly, the Hague Conference’s 2014 
report on surrogacy and parentage contains a footnote explaining that 
they removed the term ‘commercial surrogacy’, used in their preliminary 
report, following criticism from intending parents’ groups who found the 
term offensive.8 The term must also be distinguished from ‘altruistic sur-
rogacy’: in commercial surrogacy, the surrogate is paid to carry the preg-
nancy, while in altruistic surrogacy the intending parents only cover the 
surrogate’s pregnancy- related expenses. It is important to note that the 
former is currently prohibited in most European countries. At the same 
time, though, few have placed explicit restrictions on their citizens seek-
ing commercial surrogacy arrangements outside of their home country, 
both driving the demand for ICS arrangements and complicating interna-
tional legal parentage and citizenship laws.9 While several countries – the 
UK, Netherlands and Spain – do allow altruistic surrogacy, others includ-
ing Germany, France and Italy have banned all forms of surrogacy.
Those lending genetic material (and who may or may not in fact be 
legally related to the resulting child) are typically referred to as ‘donors’, 
ostensibly positioning gamete providers  – especially women offering 
their eggs – as altruistic, even where they may receive payment.10 Baylis 
argues that such a term should only be used when someone actually pro-
vides gametes altruistically; if they receive payment, however, she advo-
cates using terms that reflect the commercial nature of the transaction, 
such as ‘provider’ or ‘supplier’.11
The resultant child has perhaps ironically received the least atten-
tion in debates around terminology, given that desire for a child is the 
whole point of any type of surrogacy arrangement. Beeson et al. posit that 
this may be because ‘children play a more passive role in the process’.12 
In any case, those born through various forms of ART using gametes 
other than those of the people raising them tend to refer to themselves 
as ‘donor conceived’ – though this is not typically an accurate description 
of those born through ICS, as they are often conceived using at least one 
social parent’s gametes but are gestated and birthed by a non- genetically 
related woman. The term ‘surrogate- born children’ has thus arisen, but 
even those who have used ART to create their own families agree that 
there is not yet a satisfactory standard language for describing them.13
In sum, even the terminology debates around surrogacy index the 
contested nature of mother– child relationships in the age of ART. In an 
attempt to remain as neutral and yet as accurate as possible, I  will be 
using the term surrogacy to describe the broader practice and ICS to 
describe the prevalent cross- border gestational surrogacy arrangements 
that involve payment to the woman who acts as a surrogate – the primary 
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focus here. I  will also interchangeably use intended and commission-
ing parents to describe those initiating surrogacy arrangements where 
appropriate. I will also use the terms surrogate for the women who carry 
surrogate- born children, with the caveat that we must always keep in 
mind that children grow up and become adults whose interests must also 
be considered over the life course.
Feminist analyses of ICS
Feminist analyses of surrogacy tend to centre on the tensions between 
productive and reproductive labour resulting from the practice. A num-
ber of concerns arise in this debate, particularly regarding the marketisa-
tion of reproduction and the commodification of women and children. 
This in turn raises questions about the potential for exploitation, wom-
en’s labour, and reproductive choice and justice.
Many feminist scholars have shown concern about the marketisa-
tion of international surrogacy and its implications for women. Some 
express objections to the late- capitalist commodification of women’s 
bodies and the outsourcing of sexual and social reproduction from the 
West to developing countries.14 When new markets for ICS opened in 
places like India, Mexico, Thailand and Nepal (largely due to restrictions 
on commercial surrogacy in Europe and North America), it created com-
petition for the prohibitively priced US commercial surrogacy market. 
Suddenly, intending parents could access ICS at a fraction of the cost 
by utilising surrogates in developing countries who would work for less, 
opening the possibility of new incentives for the potential exploitation 
of poor women in developing countries by the upper classes who have 
the financial means to purchase such services.15 Aside from concerns 
with the intersections of class and gender, many debates about ICS also 
invoke the language of ‘choice’ in sexual and reproductive labour. This 
debate inevitably elicits comparisons between commercial surrogacy and 
prostitution.16 Whereas some feminist scholars invoke the right to bod-
ily autonomy in both instances and draw parallels between the ability to 
earn through use of one’s body in prostitution and in surrogacy, many 
pragmatists note that such ‘choices’ and the exercise of agency are often 
severely constrained by everyday circumstances of poverty such that 
what appear to be ‘choices’ might in fact constitute economic coercion.17 
Hewitson therefore concludes that ‘Social reproduction is thus “both 
naturalised and reprivatized” (Allon 2011: 138), and the vast inequali-
ties which characterize these exchanges become reframed as disparate 
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human capital endowments and accumulations within a rhetoric of 
choice.’18
Feminist debates thus end up going around and around in circles 
concerning the ethical implications of surrogacy for women. At the 2014 
International Forum on Intercountry Adoption and Global Surrogacy, 
participants contested the ethics of the commodification of children’s 
bodies as well, but this hinged on how surrogacy and its resultant off-
spring were framed in ICS contracts: whether the child is considered a 
product to be delivered as an indication of the completion of the contract, 
or surrogacy is considered a contracted ‘service’.19 Darnovsky and Beeson 
state that, ‘[i] f surrogacy arrangements are not to be seen as baby sell-
ing . . . payment to gestational mothers must not depend on the success 
of the pregnancy or the health of the child’.20 But this again raises ques-
tions (similar to those raised by prostitution) about whether surrogacy 
is to be seen as (re)productive labour: are surrogates labourers who pro-
duce a product, or do they provide a service? Many scholars argue that 
children cannot be seen as a product because this would not only reduce 
the child to a commodity but also ‘cheapen’ the relational bond between 
mother and child by subjecting it to marketisation.21 However one views 
it, Krawiec claims that commercial surrogacy contracts inevitably have 
the effect of increasing the role of intermediaries, who in turn stress the 
‘performance’ of surrogates, on whom their own income is dependent. 
This performance necessarily includes the surrogates’ successful delivery 
of a (healthy) child.22 Thus, according to Hewitson, ‘Consistent with the 
policy paradigms of the World Bank and the IMF, Indian surrogate moth-
ers are acting as autonomous financialised economic actors maximising 
their lifetime utility by engaging in market exchanges. Without this sense 
of self, new reproductive technologies and the privatisation and marketi-
sation of social reproduction in the form of transnational surrogacy could 
not take place . . .’23 She concludes that ICS therefore contributes to global 
inequalities between women and families rather than challenging them.
Maniere has noted that feminist theorists tend to have a very dif-
ferent take on surrogacy than those who have engaged in empirical 
studies of the practice. Those who take an abolitionist stance have usu-
ally not engaged in fieldwork that examines the actual social practice 
of surrogacy, while those who have directly observed or interviewed 
surrogates24 – though not disagreeing that the practice is highly prob-
lematic from a feminist perspective  – tend to take a more pragmatic 
stance, calling for regulation rather than an outright ban. It is interest-
ing that though feminist scholars express concern over the commodi-
fication and exploitation of women, few tend to pay much attention 
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to the child produced in surrogacy, beyond the very consideration 
of the child as ‘product’. Yet the surrogate mother and child are still 
implicated together, experienced together and cannot be separated 
until birth. In surrogacy, bodily integrity and ‘ownership’ of ‘produc-
tion’ thus take on new meanings. By the same token, childhood studies 
scholars can also be reluctant to engage with the controversial ques-
tion of when a foetus/ child gains full legal and social personhood.25 
The next section thus considers what a childhood studies approach to 
ICS might look like.
Formulating a childhood studies approach to ICS?
Unfortunately, childhood studies have yet to engage significantly with 
the issue of ICS. Scholars of childhood have not done much better than 
feminist scholarship at humanising the children produced through ICS. 
Twamley et  al. write that theorists of childhood have described femin-
ism as ‘adultist’, while feminist scholars have accused childhood studies 
scholars of neglecting the importance of gender relations;26 this tension 
may account in some way for the paucity of studies on surrogacy from a 
childhood studies perspective. Many scholars have suggested that more 
research is needed on children’s actual experiences as surrogate- born 
people,27 but few have done such research yet, perhaps also because it is 
still early days for children born from ICS arrangements. Actual research 
on children and surrogacy has focused on commercial surrogacy within 
national boundaries rather than ICS,28 and there has been broader 
research in the US around the search for identity by donor- conceived chil-
dren who have lately come of age.29 Further, the research has been con-
ducted by scholars who neither identify themselves as childhood scholars 
nor take explicitly child- centred approaches based in the discipline.
However, quite a number of scholars have considered the paral-
lels and departures between ICS and intercountry adoption studies. On 
one level, this makes sense, as adoption and surrogacy are two main 
options people consider when faced with difficulties conceiving children. 
Intercountry adoption has steadily declined over the past decade while 
ICS has increased dramatically in recent years.30 Despite their limita-
tions, such comparisons indicate what adoption studies in particular can 
contribute to current thought about the status of the child in surrogacy, 
as well as children’s points of view about the circumstances of their births 
and/ or parentage.
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Scherman et  al. recommend using the adoption triad framework 
(child, birth mother/ family and adoptive mother/ family) for studying 
mother– child relations in surrogacy.31 However, Rotabi and Bromfield 
caution that the parallels between adoption and surrogacy are limited 
and therefore potentially problematic, especially in comparing birth 
mothers in adoption to surrogates.32 For starters, birth mothers in adop-
tion do not commence their pregnancies with the intention of giving up 
the children once they are born. They are also genetically related to the 
children they relinquish, as opposed to the people to whom they relin-
quish the child(ren), and birth mothers typically receive no payment for 
child relinquishment (or at least they are legally prohibited from doing 
so, or it would be considered child trafficking). Research with birth moth-
ers in adoption typically reveals a continual sense of loss and regret long 
after relinquishing their children to adoption,33 whereas surrogates talk 
somewhat more positively about the experience – even as a selfless act 
that helps others who are unable to have children.34 Scherman et al. also 
point out that ‘Unlike their surrogate counterparts, birth mothers do not 
experience a strong sense of empowerment from their decisions to relin-
quish. Moreover, there is no evidence indicating that pregnancy or relin-
quishing children into adoption were ever considered forms of “work”.’35
The experiences of adoptees and surrogate- born children/ adults can 
also vary widely. Whereas many adoptees may experience difficulties with 
identity formation due to lack of knowledge of their origins – which can 
also be true of donor- conceived children – current research as yet shows lit-
tle indication of such problems for surrogate- born children.36 Regardless, 
adoption practices gradually shifted from secrecy to openness, aiding 
adopted people in understanding their origins and identities through 
the lens of their adoptions; there is every indication that such openness 
will be of equal importance to children born through ICS arrangements. 
Consequently, one thing scholars and activists agree on is that preservation 
of records is vitally important in both cases;37 not ‘to fetishize the genetic 
or gestational connection’ but ‘to acknowledge that these connections are 
meaningful and resonant to many people born of third- party assisted con-
ception and [are] likely to continue to be so in the future’.38
Feminism and the politics of childhood in ICS
While it is true that discussing women and children together runs the 
risk of reifying their relationship, the reverse is also true: discussing them 
separately produces a particularly antagonising tension between female 
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and child subjectivities.39 Given the dimensions described above, surro-
gacy debates offer a compelling example through which to grapple with 
the central questions of this volume. Below, I  focus on how surrogacy 
debates speak to three of the central issues raised by the editors.
Ensuring the well- being of children and women
The issue of how to ensure the well-being of both women and children 
is central to surrogacy debates, as surrogacy itself is a context wherein 
their interests arguably appear to be at odds – at least in the way vari-
ous feminists have critiqued it. Feminist scholars have argued that ICS 
especially is exploitative of poor women of colour in the global South, 
whose bodies are utilised to produce babies for wealthier white families 
in the global North. Many bioethicists have taken this stance, arguing 
that the medical risks taken on by surrogates jeopardise their health in 
favour of that of the children they carry for commissioning parents.40 
These include hormonal stimulation side effects, heightened medical 
risks from the non- medically indicated caesarean section births that are 
routine in surrogacy, lack of follow- up health care, and multiple psycho-
logical consequences related to stigmatisation, secrecy and immediate 
separation from the babies they have carried.41 Feminist scholars thereby 
question the ethics of protecting the ‘product’ at the physical expense of 
the ‘producer’.
Children’s best interests in ICS debates tend to be framed within 
a children’s rights discourse. Elsewhere I  have argued that such dis-
courses, particularly in international law, are problematic for the ways 
in which children’s ‘best interests’ are often arbitrarily framed primar-
ily by adults who seldom consult children for their actual views.42 The 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, which is responsible for 
the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, has been debat-
ing the establishment of a separate international convention for the regu-
lation of surrogacy and legal parentage.43 They claim that while states 
are not necessarily changing prohibitive policies on allowing domestic 
surrogacy or travel abroad to avoid national prohibitions on surrogacy 
arrangements, more and more courts are making decisions regarding 
legal parentage of children born through surrogacy arrangements ‘in the 
best interests of the child’ involved – often to prevent the children from 
being stateless (a violation of their rights). Yet these decisions constitute 
ex post facto checks once a child already exists as a result of ICS arrange-
ments. Hence, ‘this is already too late to be able to exercise any mean-
ingful control’44 over the ethics or legalities of ICS. This also means that 
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‘the best interests of the child’ are effectively being usurped to defend 
the choices of intended parents. Such examples expose the limits of the 
‘child’s best interest’ principle, which sidesteps other issues of human 
rights and ethics in surrogacy to determine the best interests of a child 
who may not even have been conceived yet.
The paramountcy of children’s best interests is an example of 
what Baird calls child fundamentalism, ‘the ways in which “the child” 
is so often invoked as a discursive category with which one cannot dis-
agree . . .’45 This then gets cited in such a way that policymakers can 
utilise the ‘best interests’ of children who do not yet exist to argue for 
their own political views. Ruddick points out that such legal manoeu-
vres are often applied in debates about foetal rights, resulting in ‘a 
paradoxical situation where the “fetus” is granted a more authoritative 
voice in terms of what it “wants” than is the child, whose wishes are 
perpetually called into question’ in legal proceedings.46 This was also 
the case in the 2009 New South Wales Surrogacy Bill in Australia. In 
debates about the bill, politicians invoked ‘children’s best interests’ to 
make the (heterosexist) argument that allowing gay and lesbian cou-
ples to use surrogacy as a means of forming a family deprives children 
of a ‘proper’ family environment, which they interpreted as being com-
posed of a heteronormative nuclear family47 – a topic I return to later 
in this section.
Challenging the mother– child dyad in ICS
The question of whether women’s and children’s interests are neces-
sarily opposed or inevitably linked depends on the woman to whom 
one is referring in an ICS arrangement, as well as the underlying pre-
sumptions one makes about the primacy of the mother– child dyad. In 
the case of an intended mother, proponents evoke the right to moth-
erhood and the cultural/ legal primacy of genetic relatedness to justify 
the commissioning of a surrogate – and since surrogacy in Mexico or 
India is cheaper than in the United States (and is outlawed in much of 
Europe), ICS gives women who might not otherwise be able to conceive 
and/ or carry a pregnancy the chance to become mothers. In the case 
of surrogates, many feminists argue that it exploits their reproductive 
labour, but in Pande’s seminal ethnography of Indian commercial sur-
rogate mothers, Wombs in Labor, the surrogates themselves often say 
that amidst dire poverty, surrogacy offers them their only viable option 
to help their own families as well as someone else’s.48 In fact, they often 
invoke their own self- sacrifice as mothers to justify being a commercial 
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surrogate by saying that they decided to do it in order to help provide 
for their own children.
ICS thus both denaturalises and reinforces the mother– child dyad 
in various ways  – and with varying consequences for the relationships 
between women and children. On the one hand, ICS denaturalises the rela-
tions between women and children by offering new ways of understanding 
mother– child relationality; on the other, many women who cannot carry 
children themselves are driven by social reproductive imperatives that 
define womanhood through motherhood to seek alternative means such 
as surrogacy to have children. Thanks to ART, surrogate- born children can 
now have up to five ‘parents’:  egg provider, sperm provider, gestational 
mother, and two intended parents – including up to four mothers.49 The car-
rying of a child in the womb loses import as a type of relational, kin work/ 
care – which in turn devalues women’s labour (literally) – while still pla-
cing primacy on the genetic relatedness of women and children. Moreover, 
Hewitson has claimed that  – partly due to reproduction’s marketisation 
through surrogacy – ‘neoliberalism constructs and relies upon the family 
as a collection of intensely- bonded parents and children while also articu-
lating the family members and surrogate mothers as self- actualizing, risk- 
managing consumers and entrepreneurs’.50 Children themselves may no 
longer be seen (legally or culturally) as ‘property’ of parents, but they are 
commonly seen as beings that parents are meant to ‘invest’ in for the ‘pro-
duction’ of a future adult who is him/ herself a ‘productive’ person51 – not 
to mention the incredible emotional investment with which children have 
come to be endowed, such that we typically efface the interplay of econ-
omy and affect in the commoditisation of children.52
Rosen has written about the issue of time and temporality in the 
construction of woman– child relationships.53 One of the reasons surro-
gacy is controversial is because of the transience of surrogate mother-
hood, which seems to run counter to the notion of a permanent bond 
created between mother and child through the experience of pregnancy. 
However, while some surrogates are resigned to the contractual termi-
nation of the mother– child link upon delivery (as Rotabi and Bromfield 
state that many US surrogates are: in fact, they state that the child was 
never ‘theirs to give up’ in the first place because it always belonged to the 
commissioning parents54), some surrogates also contest this ‘unnatural’ 
temporality of motherhood in their conception of the practice. The sur-
rogates in Pande’s study often talked of commercial surrogacy as ‘moth-
ering’ along the lines of other forms of care work, and as ‘kin labour’, 
to counter the ephemerality of the transaction and their own dispos-
ability as workers (see Crivello and Espinosa, this volume, for a detailed 
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discussion of care labour and temporal vulnerability). They stated that 
even though they gave the child to the genetic parents, they have inter-
minable connections by virtue of the pregnancy – and that these in fact 
(if not in law) override any genetic claim to a maternal bond. As one sur-
rogate told Pande, ‘After all, it’s my blood even if it’s their genes’.55
What few studies there are of how surrogacy affects children report 
that both a surrogate’s pre- existing children and surrogate- born children 
tend to have overwhelmingly positive feelings about the circumstances of 
their births.56 Though their sample of surrogate- born children was small, 
13 out of the 14 10- year- old children in Jadva et al.’s study who were in 
contact with their surrogates reported that they liked them.
Meanwhile, donor- conceived offspring are reconfiguring kinship 
around new ART, using advances in genetics testing and information and 
communication technologies to establish mechanisms for identification 
of genetic relations such as the Donor Sibling Registry. Dempsey and 
Kelly report that ‘donor- conceived young people who form relationships 
with donor siblings often view them as equivalent to “extended family” 
with all the nuances of meaning that that term entails when applied to 
family of origin . . .’57 It is doubtful that surrogate- born children would 
feel the same about others born from the same gestational surrogate, 
however  – especially where relationships with surrogates (unlike with 
gamete donors) fall outside of patriliny and transgress racial, national, 
and class lines – but this is a crucial area for further study.
In sum, while the practice of ICS itself offers opportunities to 
denaturalise the mother– child dyad, the ways that the practice is con-
strued and constructed by participants may in fact reinforce the ‘natural’ 
links between both surrogate and commissioning women and the chil-
dren they birth or raise – often as a way to subvert the commercial con-
text of the interaction.
Contesting and reinforcing compulsory heterosexuality?
One of the shortcomings of surrogacy practice is that it does not nec-
essarily challenge patriliny or the compulsory heterosexuality of the 
nuclear family. Though ICS arrangements themselves are arguably prod-
ucts of neoliberal economic policies that reinforce the heteronormativity 
of the patriarchal nuclear family,58 surrogacy also decentres such heter-
onormativity in that many gay couples are using surrogacy as a means 
to form genetically related offspring. This confounds the compulsory 
heterosexism of presumed rights and entitlements to family. However, 
it is still problematic in that the state has both privatised and reified the 
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imperatives of social reproduction,59 not just for women but for gay cou-
ples. Opening opportunities for gay and lesbian couples to form geneti-
cally related families through various ARTs also pulls gay couples into 
the marketisation of reproduction in ways that expose them to the same 
classed and gendered criticisms as heterosexual intending parents:  of 
exploitation of poor women, and of reinforcing the patriarchal defini-
tions of family through emphasis on genetic links, particularly to fathers.
Applying a childhood studies lens to ICS:  
toward a relational approach
Attention to actual surrogate- born people’s concerns is paramount in 
emergent ICS debates. The concerns of children born through ICS can 
help add a vital dimension to the above debates, and may even reconcile 
some schisms in feminist thinking about ICS. Because of the ‘passive’ role 
of children in ICS and the fact that they are yet unborn, childhood studies 
scholars, who tend to privilege children’s ‘voices’, have as yet done lit-
tle research on the topic. If adoption studies are any indication, though, 
surrogate- born children will also want access to information about their 
origins and/ or contact with their surrogate mothers. This opens up an 
important opportunity not only to advance scholarly debates about sur-
rogacy beyond the conundrums of feminist scholarship but to inform that 
same scholarship with a more holistic, relational approach. For example, 
we can expand the discussion of how – though surrogates and intended 
parents both tend to frame ICS as altruistic – intended parents might see 
the surrogate as having a more transient relationship with the commis-
sioning parents and child rather than an enduring relationship with the 
family, as surrogates and surrogate- born children do. Here again, adop-
tion provides an important model for refiguring the relationships between 
women and children while expanding the notion of family through the 
‘adoption triad’; we can also start to move toward similar openness in ICS 
by developing the concept of the ‘surrogacy triad’ to include children, 
commissioning parents and surrogate mothers in an ongoing relation-
ship. Studies have shown that this model has been beneficial to all in 
adoption,60 and preliminary indications are that openness in surrogacy is 
also largely positive for all involved.61
In order for childhood studies to effectively address issues in 
ICS around which feminists have continually circled, they will have to 
go beyond a simple children’s rights discourse to consider children’s 
lived experiences. Scholars like Darling and Crawshaw have written 
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extensively about the children’s rights implications of commercial surro-
gacy,62 making great in- roads especially in regards to challenges of state-
lessness and citizenship. But they tend to fall into the same quagmire of 
subjectivity as feminist analyses in that they rely on the highly subjec-
tive ‘best- interest principle’ in international law. Rather than assuming 
what is best for (imaginary) children in ICS, relying more on empirical 
evidence centred on the actual viewpoints and experiences of surrogate- 
born children and the adults they become can more realistically speak to 
the concerns ICS raises about the relationships between women and chil-
dren. Further, a relational approach toward examining the connections 
between surrogate- born children and others in the surrogacy triad – their 
commissioning and surrogate mothers, as well as their relationships with 
their surrogates’ other children – precludes the possibility of neglecting 
either women or children in the analysis.
It is still early days for ICS, though, and little empirical research 
has actually been conducted – but this also stems from prevalent assump-
tions that young children cannot respond to questions about the practice. 
Childhood studies scholars have developed effective qualitative methods 
for working with even very young children that could help remove this 
obstacle; it is not essential to wait until children grow up to see how a 
phenomenon such as ICS affects them.
On the other hand, it is also important to recognise that children do 
eventually grow up. It is thus important to consider the effects of surro-
gacy on children without reifying them as individuals or framing child-
hood as a static state. Early adoption studies as well as policies tended to 
fall into this trap: freezing adoptees in time as vulnerable children with-
out adequate acknowledgement of the adults they eventually became.63 
Only as a result of adult adoptees lobbying for reform did changes in 
adoption law and practice occur to start reflecting adoptees’ needs over 
the life course. Scherman et al. note that:
The field of surrogacy has the unique opportunity to do now what 
the field of adoption was painfully late in realising:  plan for the 
adults that the children will eventually become. It is critical that the 
industry does not wait for the children of global surrogacy to grow 
up before establishing policies and laws that support and protect 
them not only as children, but also as the autonomous individuals 
they will become.64
Finally, we should embrace the opportunities for more collaborative 
work afforded by such topics as ICS that necessarily bring women and 
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children into contested contact. In so doing, we should not make undue 
assumptions of mutual exclusivity; one can be a feminist and a scholar 
of children and childhood, a scholar of women’s studies and a children’s 
advocate, etc. It is not a matter of constantly ‘switching lenses’ but rather 
of taking a relational approach that incorporates both feminist and child- 
centred concerns, working toward the common goals of social and eco-
nomic justice. Considering the ‘surrogacy triad’ is one example of how 
this might be achieved.
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